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ABSTRACT 
This essay derives its focus on poetry from the subtitle of Die Fröhliche Wissenshaft: “la gaya scienza.”  
Nietzsche appropriated this phrase from the phrase “gai saber” used by the Provençal knight-poets 
(or troubadours) of the eleventh through thirteenth centuries — the first lyric poets of the 
European languages — to designate their Ars Poetica or “art of poetry.”  I will begin with an 
exploration of Nietzsche’s treatment of poets and poetry as a subject matter, closely analyzing his 
six aphorisms which deal explicitly with poets and poetry.  Having considered The Gay Science as 
a text about poetry, I will then briefly explore three further ways in which The Gay Science can be 
thought of as itself a kind of poetry.  The result of these analyses is an understanding of 
Nietzsche’s own understanding of philosophy (and of the best way to live) as also a form of 
poetry.   
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Tell all the Truth but tell it slant – 
Success in Circuit lies 
Too bright for our infirm Delight 
The Truth’s superb surprise 
 -Emily Dickinson (ca. 1868)1
 
 
 
  
I. The Gay Science on Poetry 
 
There are six aphorisms in The Gay Science that are centrally concerned with 
poetry as such:  three in Book Two, one in Book Three, and two in Book Four.  I 
will consider them in the order in which they appear in the text, building a 
cumulative sense of Nietzsche’s understanding of poetry and thereby of his 
own Ars Poetica.  I will begin with three aphorisms that investigate the 
sources of (1) the poet’s power, (2) poetry itself, and (3) the phenomenon of 
“prose” as a kind of calcified poetry.  From the beginning, one can see that 
poetry is not, for Nietzsche as opposed to Heidegger, some omnipotent, 
metaphysical force filled with gravitas.2  Instead, poetry for Nietzsche is 
essentially incomplete, it traffics in the fantasy world of magic, and it is not 
above masking itself as its apparent other — prose. 
 Aphorism 79 argues that the source of poets’ power and appeal lies in 
their forever approaching their goals without achieving them.  “Indeed, [the 
poet] owes his advantages and fame much more to his ultimate incapacity 
than to his ample strength [Kraft].”  Nietzsche writes of the poet’s “foretaste” 
of a “vision” which is never wholly captured, and which by that very fact 
inspires such powerful cravings in the poet that it even spreads contagiously 
to the poet’s listeners, and “lifts [them] above [the poet’s] work and all mere 
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‘works’ and lends them wings to soar as high as listeners had never soared.”  
The eros or Lust for the poet’s ever-unfulfilled vision thus erotically 
transforms the listeners “into poets and seers” themselves.  The expanding 
range of the concept of poet in this radical democratization, though it is 
seemingly anathema to Nietzsche’s aristocratic sensibilities, also prefigures 
his later discussion of a kind of poetry of life, living one’s life as a form of 
poetry, to which I will return below. 
This interplay of erotic forces also suggests the eros of the Platonic 
dialogues, particularly the Ion, in which Socrates describes the young Ion’s 
tremendous yet comical power over those who experience his recitations of 
Homer.  As Socrates puts it to Ion, “this is not an art in you whereby you speak 
well on Homer, but a divine power, which moves like the stone which 
Euripedes named a magnet.” 3  As for the comical dimension, during this 
divine inspiration, the poet “has been put out of his senses, and his mind is 
no longer in him.” 4  Given Nietzsche’s love of philology and the ancient 
Greeks, it would be surprising if he did not have this connection to Ion as the 
comically inarticulate poetic performer in mind. 
 Aphorism 84 builds on Nietzsche’s understanding of the poet as 
master of potentiality, with its central thesis that the Ursprung of poetry — its 
origin or “upspring” as in Heidegger’s Ursprung des Kunstwerkes — lies in “the 
magical song and the spell.”  In German, aphorism 84 reads as follows:  
Zauberlied und Besprechung scheinen die Urgestalt der Poesie zu sein.  “Magic-song 
and incantation shines the originary-form of poetry to be.”  Against the 
popular conception of poetry as currently useless and therefore useless in its 
origins, Nietzsche asserts that, on the contrary, poetry had originally “a very 
great utility,” a utility that was “superstitious” or “mythological” 
[abergläubische].   
He explains that in ancient times, the awareness of rhythm as a 
mnemonic device for human beings was generalized to the belief that 
rhythm affected the gods in the same way, and that a “rhythmical prayer was 
supposed to get closer to the ears of the gods.”  In short, rhythm was seen as a 
way to exert power and control over even the gods in what contemporary 
Westerners would characterize as a silly, superstitious way.  “[M]an warf ihnen 
die Poesie wie eine magische Schlinge um:  One threw, at the gods, poetry like a 
magical lasso.”   
It is also interesting that Nietzsche in the preceding quote 
characterizes rhythm, the chief music of poetry, as a compulsion (Zwang):  
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the same word he uses to describe “every morality” in Beyond Good and Evil, in 
which he links moral compulsion to “the metrical compulsion [Zwang] of 
rhyme and rhythm.” 5  Thus, both morality and poetry according to Nietzsche 
have a “compulsive” power, and in both cases this compulsion is linked to 
religion.  For poetry this link to religion is explicit, as poetry is the lasso that 
pulls the gods.  And as for morality, Nietzsche attributes what he terms “slave 
morality” to the priestly class of the Jewish people, the central aspect of 
whose faith is the sacred text (especially the Torah).  Put differently, poetry in 
general for Nietzsche (like the Jewish poetry of the Tanakh) is a tool through 
which the priest can compel the people with their preferred new morality. 
The poet from aphorism 79 can thus be thought of as a sort of priest or 
mountebank, hawking a truth that is always deferred and delivered in the 
compulsion of the music of language.  The poet is part of the same priestly 
lineage from which, according to the third essay in On the Genealogy of Morals, 
the philosopher is born.6 
 To resume my reading of aphorism 84 of The Gay Science, and return 
from the specific issue of religious magic to magic in general:  Nietzsche also 
distinguishes “an even stranger notion that may have contributed most of all 
to the origin of poetry” — “the power of discharging the emotions, of 
purifying the soul… precisely by means of rhythm.”  Nietzsche seems to be 
speaking here of the famous catharsis of Aristotle’s Poetics.  “[O]ne sought to 
push the exuberance and giddiness of the emotions to an extreme … a 
tranquilizer, not because it is tranquil itself, but because its aftereffects make 
one tranquil.”  Nietzsche also stresses the everyday utility of poetry as 
incantation or spell:  “Every action provides an occasion for song: every action 
depends on the assistance of spirits.”  In other words, poetry is 
simultaneously ordinary and divine, since every action is worthy of song, 
every song is composed of lyrics (that is, lyric poetry), and every action 
requires divine assistance.  With regard to the larger issue of poetry’s origins, 
the point is that something which now strikes us as banal nevertheless 
began as divine — because the everyday for the ancient Greeks was itself a 
magical thing.  Put differently, we undervalue poetry because we 
underestimate the magic of the ordinary. 
 Nietzsche concludes aphorism 84 by discussing the role of poetry in 
prophecy.  He claims that prophecy meant originally, etymologically, “to get 
something determined … to bind the future.”  The power of rhythm was 
believed to be so great that when wielded by Apollo, it could “bind even the 
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goddesses of fate”:  goddesses so strong that, in Homer, even Zeus is 
powerless to control them.  And remember here that Nietzsche was an 
atheist, and thus is not affirming prophecy as a legitimate and objectively 
rich faculty.  Instead, he is affirming it as a fictively creative power.  And that 
is the larger point of the entire aphorism.  To wit, Nietzsche is attempting to 
separate the form of poetry from specific religious content so that he can 
both practice and advocate redeploying the form with new and better 
content.  In other words, the Jewish priests used poetry to create gods, to 
compel their communities to live according to certain ethical values, but 
those values have outlived their purpose, and we have not yet learned to tap 
into that power of poetry in order to inspire present-day communities to live 
by new ethical values that will better promote flourishing today. 
 Aphorism 92 provides a greater clarification and expansion of 
Nietzsche’s concept of poetry by juxtaposing it with prose.  The aphorism 
begins: “It is noteworthy that the great masters of prose have almost always 
been poets, too … Good prose is only written face to face with poetry.”  Prose 
“is an uninterrupted war with poetry:  all of its attractions depend on the way 
in which poetry is continually avoided and contradicted.”  Just as it is often 
argued in the professional dance community that ballet is the foundational 
dance, one sees Nietzsche arguing that poetry is the fundamental linguistic 
art, the arche of writing.  In other words, anything other than poetry can only 
be written by, so to speak, turning poetry against itself, wresting the poetic 
away from poetry.  Westerners today tend to adopt a contrasting view in 
which poetry is augmented and ornamented prose.  But for Nietzsche, prose 
is fundamentally a stripped-down form of poetry, a poetry that negates most 
of its musicality and rhythm.  So when prose asserts its minimalist 
independence from poetry, that is really just poetry minimizing itself.  Poetry 
is thus a form of self-overcoming, while prose is one result or manifestation 
of that self-overcoming.  As with the employment of rhythm to coerce the 
Fates, prose is merely a tool capable of perhaps bending the will of poetry 
but never of fully overpowering it.   
All language for Nietzsche is fundamentally poetry although some 
poetry is so stripped down and minimal that it goes by another name, 
“prose.”  When one wants to accomplish certain goals — such as precision, 
clarity, or the appearance of scientific objectivity — it makes sense to write in 
the sub-genre of poetry that is prose.  Nietzsche elaborates:  
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Everything abstract wants to be read as a prank against poetry and as with a 
mocking voice; everything dry and cool is meant to drive the lovely goddess into 
despair.  Often there are rapprochements, reconciliations for a moment — and 
then a sudden leap back and laughter.  Often the curtain is raised and harsh light 
let in just as the goddess is enjoying her dusks and muted colors.  Often the 
words are taken out of her mouth and sung to a tune that drives her to cover her 
refined ears with her refined hands.  Thus there are thousands of delights in this 
war.7 
 
This is a remarkable passage for several reasons.  It constitutes a piece of 
prose that is performative of the very warfare it articulates between prose 
and poetry.  For Nietzsche, following Heraclitus, “War [thus, conflict, strife, 
opposition] is the father of all good things,” including “good prose.” 8   In the 
passage above, Nietzsche’s prose dances and flirts with poetic imagery and 
devices such as metaphor and personification as it laughingly describes the 
same process. 
However, there also seems to be a highly problematic, sadistic, sexual 
dimension to this passage.  Poetry is personified as a goddess, a woman with 
whom one toys.  One is cool towards her out of cruelty and then sadistically 
enjoys her ensuing despair.  One feigns agreeableness only to savor her pain 
when the agreeableness is withdrawn.  One steals her voice only to turn it 
against her painfully, all the while mocking her overly refined nature.  In a 
sense, in the middle of this warfare between poetry and prose, the prose 
warrior bursts into the poetic stronghold to violate the poetic enemy. 
 On another analysis, this passage may itself be read as poetry.  It is a 
poetry masquerading as prose that is locked in battle with poetry — and a 
poetry which laughs secretly at the reader for assuming that he or she is 
reading prose and assuming that the struggle between prose and poetry 
symbolized by the sexual imagery and language constitutes a sort of 
violation of poetry by prose — when in actuality, the entire scene is a fiction 
deployed by poetry for her own pleasure.   
 In order to corroborate the interpretation of aphorism 92 as poetry, I 
will now reproduce it in the original German in order to note a couple of 
poetic elements that were inevitably lost in translation: 
 
 
Jedes Abstraktum will als Schalkheit gegen diese und wie mit spöttischer 
Stimme vorgetragen sein; jede Trockenheit und Kühle soll die liebliche Göttin in 
eine liebliche Verzweifung bringen; oft gibt es Annäherungen, Versöhnungen 
des Augenblickes und dann ein plötzliches Zurückspringen und Auslachen; oft 
wird der Vorhang aufgezogen und grelles Licht hereingelassen, während gerade 
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die Göttin ihre Dämmerungen und dumpfen Farben genießt; oft wird ihr das 
Wort aus dem Munde genommen und nach einer Melodie abgesungen, bei der 
sie die feinen Hände vor die feinen Öhrchen hält, — und so gibt es tausend 
Vergnügungen des Krieges.9 
 
Note the alliteration of “s” sounds in the first clause and “k” sounds in the 
second clause as well as Nietzsche’s use of repetition (for example, of the 
word “liebliche” in the second clause.)  Note also the rolling cadence of the 
third clause, primarily established by the falling metrical pattern of the 
words:  the first syllable is stressed, and the last syllables are not — as in 
“Aus-lach-en” and “plötz-lich-es.” 
 In reviewing aphorism 92, one might conclude that Nietzsche 
presents poetry as the true arche of prose in the dual sense of origin or source 
and of governing principle or ruling trajectory.  Nietzsche thereby 
problematizes the general distinction between poetry and prose, and the 
distinction between poetry and philosophy qua argumentative prose that is 
evident in his own writing.  Is all philosophy simply poetry that to some 
extent resists its own “poeticity”? 
 Poetry, construed as the arche of prose, is thus strongly implicated in 
the lineage of philosophy.  At least in Nietzsche’s work, quoted above, 
philosophy demonstrates itself a rightful inheritor of the characteristics of 
poetry elaborated in aphorisms 79 and 84 above.  The philosopher manifests 
as the unwitting carrier of the traits of the seductive, ever-seeking, ever-
unfinished visionary, working in a linguistic medium born as magic and 
spells.  What is more, if we attend to the history of this marginalized origin of 
philosophy in poetry, the memories of these spells can be restored to the 
philosopher, and the traits show themselves as a visible phenotype.  In other 
words, the philosopher can become a poet.  The benefit of this 
transformation is the ability to create worlds that do not forget their creative 
origins, which origins imply that we can and perhaps ought to laugh at 
“those creations,” rather than force those creations on others in the guise of 
absolute truth. 
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II. The Gay Science as Problematizing of  
the Poet and Poetry 
 
Having developed a general picture of the poet and poetry for Nietzsche, I 
now turn to the last three aphorisms on poetry in The Gay Science, which 
further explore the nature of the poet in ways that liberate the figure of the 
poet from both (1) a religiously-informed portrayal as medium of 
transcendent truth and (2) a narrow conceptualization as one who simply 
writes poems as instances of a literary genre.  Beginning with (1), Nietzsche’s 
most condensed statement of what makes poets unfit to serve as 
mouthpieces for transcendent truth appears in aphorism 222:  “Poet and liar 
[Dichter und Lügner]:  the poet considers the liar a foster brother [Milchbruder:  
literally, ‘milk brother,’ nursed by the same woman] whose milk the poet has 
drunk; so it is that the liar remains wretched and has not once attained a 
good conscience.”  The title of the aphorism, in which the names of the two 
figures constitute a half-rhyme or slant rhyme, adds literary potency to their 
discursive identification in the sentence that follows.  Not only is the poet a 
liar, but his or her name also partially rhymes with the word “liar.”   
One may consider the privation of the poet as a privation insofar as 
lying is considered a privation of the truth.  In formal logic, the presence of 
even one embedded negation or privation in an argument alters its 
conclusion.  According to my descriptions of Nietzsche’s other aphorisms 
above, the poet emerges as a more original form of the philosopher.  The 
philosopher is thus as — an amnesiac-rebellious poet — indirectly 
condemned as essentially a liar as well. 
 It is not entirely surprising that Nietzsche should describe the poet 
as a liar, since in aphorism 79 he describes the poet as a visionary who lures 
others with the deception that his or her vision will eventually be realized.  
And in aphorism 84, he describes poetry as originating from incantations 
and other obscure occult practices, which certainly do not ring with 
connotations of truth to ears accustomed to scientific materialism.  
Furthermore, aphorism 84 ends with the following Homeric quote:  “Many 
lies tell the poets.”  And in aphorism 92, poetry was also described as 
deceptive insofar as it often parades in a deformed disguise calling itself 
prose. 
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But in aphorism 222, this deceptive nature is made much more 
explicit to the extent that the poet drinks the same milk as the common liar 
but is only half-brother to the liar.  The only significant difference between 
the two figures is that the poet achieves power and dubious renown while 
the liar remains despised.  One assumes that the source of poetry’s better 
fortune lies in its magical-musical aspects since only those who lie in prose 
are persecuted while their lyrically-inclined relatives prosper under a 
different name. 
 As a result of this essential deceptiveness, Nietzsche’s poets 
doubtlessly prove themselves unworthy of the mantle of absolute truth and 
equally deserving of their exile from communities that hold absolute truth 
most precious, such as the allegedly ideal “city in speech” in Plato’s Republic.10  
But this unworthiness with regard to Truth also allows Nietzsche to praise 
the poets for their considerable power and charm without fear of elevating 
the poets to the level of new transcendent idols.   
By naming the poet as liar, Nietzsche as himself a lying poet 
performs a self-overcoming of lying as it has been understood in Western 
culture.  The lie in its role as the poet’s instrument begins to absorb the 
magical quality and beautiful seductive music that formerly belonged only 
to poetry.  Nietzsche is in effect assisting the poet’s milk-brother in finally 
getting his fair share of the milk, becoming healthy and strong and attaining 
a good conscience — all of which seems appropriate, given that the will to lie 
and the will to poetry for Nietzsche are but two names for the same drive, 
the same will to power. 
This radical homogenization of deception and poetry has various 
implications both inside and outside of poetry as literary genre.  In the 
context of poetry’s sharing its powers and positive status with its formerly 
unacknowledged relatives, consider The Gay Science’s oft-quoted aphorism 
299: 
 
What one should learn from artists. —  How can we make things beautiful, 
attractive, and desirable for us when they are not?  And I rather think that in 
themselves they never are.  Here we could learn something from physicians, 
when for example they dilute what is bitter or add wine and sugar to a mixture 
— but even more from artists who are really continually trying to bring off such 
inventions and feats.  Moving away from things until there is a good deal that 
one no longer sees and there is much that our eye has to add if we are still to see 
them at all; or seeing things around a corner and as cut out or framed; or to place 
them so that they partially conceal each other and grant us only glimpses of 
architectural perspectives; or looking at them through tinted glass or in the light 
of sunset; or giving them a surface and skin that is not fully transparent — all 
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this we should learn from artists while being wiser than they are in other 
matters.  For with them this subtle power usually comes to an end where art ends and 
life begins; but we want to be the poets of our life — first of all in the smallest most 
everyday matters.11 
  
This entire passage, too, is remarkable and merits careful consideration.  
First, Nietzsche remarks that he thinks life is never beautiful, attractive, or 
desirable in itself.  If Nietzsche took metaphysical claims to the realities of 
things “in themselves” seriously, this would indeed be a very dark sentiment.  
But for Nietzsche there is always the issue of all-too-human perspectives 
that necessarily rule out the possibility of a divine perspective for human 
beings.  That is, by his own reasoning, Nietzsche can only be making this 
claim, whether genuinely or ironically, from one particular embodied 
perspective.  Either he is serious, but it is just one person speaking from one 
position at one moment in history.  Or he is disingenuous.  But in neither case 
is this the timeless, absolute, “God’s honest” truth about human life.
 Second, Nietzsche in a certain way equates the physician’s work and 
the artist’s work.  Both kinds of work pursue a similar goal, namely making 
the undesirable world appear desirable, and even their methods are 
somewhat similar.  The physician, however, acts to  shift the perception of the 
patient in a way that is unconscious for the patient (for example by helping a 
diabetic patient regulate her/his insulin levels, part of the benefit of which is 
more stable mood, as hypoglycemia can cause distressing feelings).  By 
contrast, the artist works to consciously shift the viewer’s perceptions.  A 
more important distinguishing factor than medium, however, appears to be 
the intensity or obsessive duration of the artist’s efforts, insofar as the artist 
is “really continually trying” to make the world appear beautiful.  Since artists 
are trying to do so all the time and thus have plenty of experience, Nietzsche 
seems to suggest that we see what can be learned from their efforts. 
 The reader is then instructed to learn the following specific things:  
(1) to create distance between oneself and a thing until one is forced to create 
parts of the thing that one can no longer perceive in order to perceive the 
thing at all — as in the literary criticism of ancient texts for example; (2) to 
adopt an unusual perspective (which is typically considered inferior) on 
something — as in free-wheeling scientific experimentation; (3) to artificially 
frame a thing or put it in a different context; (4) to arrange things in such a 
way that each one obscures one’s view of the others; (5) to examine things 
through tinted glass or inferior media; (6) to examine things at unusual 
times; and (7) to intentionally obscure an otherwise clear view of something 
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— all of which are possible descriptions of intentional, repressive, active 
forgetting. 
 These paraphrases and examples as well of course are merely 
possible interpretations — and similarly untrustworthy ones — of the will to 
knowledge that is always already the will “to ignorance, to the uncertain, to 
the untrue!” 12  However, according to Nietzsche we wish to go beyond the 
instructive example of the artist.  And to do so requires that we liberate this 
deceptive practice of the artist from the confines of art and extend it to every 
other practice in our world, to the very living of our lives.  “Wir aber wollen die 
Dichter unseres Lebens sein, und im Kleinsten und Alltäglichsten zuerst! —  We, 
however, wish the poets of our lives to be, and in that which is smallest and 
most everyday, first.”  It seems this would entail the joyful celebration of 
perspectives and the carefree utilization of deception where necessary in our 
lives.  In the light of the previous aphorisms, we wish to be the visionaries 
who hunger perennially for visions never fully realized in a language born as 
poetry, born as magical spells, fighting a constant war to return our prose to 
poetry, the joyful deceived-deceivers, the “tempting-attempting 
experimenters [Versucher].” 13  
 One might wonder, however, what would stop the inevitable collapse 
of society consequent upon everyone’s beginning to lie without constraint or 
inhibition.  The answer lies in the very specific audience for whom 
Nietzsche’s challenge was intended.  He writes of what “one” should learn 
from artists and of the “we” who wish to be the poets of our lives.  But who 
exactly are these people?  Did they even exist for Nietzsche when he 
composed these lines?  If not, do they exist now?  The final aphorism I will 
consider, 301, should prove helpful in this context. 
 This aphorism treats of the “higher human beings” who “see and hear 
immeasurably more, and see and hear thoughtfully.”  But this type of higher 
human being, according to Nietzsche, “can never shake off a delusion … He 
calls his own nature contemplative and overlooks that er selbst auch der 
eigentliche Dichter und Fortdichter des Lebens ist [that he himself, also, the actual 
poet and ever-poet of life is].” 14  In this passage, appearing only two 
aphorisms after the one just considered, one finds that it is the higher 
human beings, the contemplatives, the free spirits, who are not merely being 
encouraged to expand the will to untruth from art to life but rather already 
doing so: 
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As a poet, he has … above all vis creativa, which the active human being lacks … 
We [higher people] who think and feel at the same time are those who really 
continually fashion something that had not been there before:  the whole 
eternally growing world of valuations, colors, accents, perspectives, scales, 
affirmations, and negations.  This poem that we have invented is continually 
studied by the so-called practical human beings (our actors) who learn their 
roles and translate everything into flesh and actuality, into the everyday.15  
 
Thus, the higher persons in their continual acts of poetic creation actually 
create the world of meaning, signification, and value that all human beings 
inhabit.  Nietzsche is never clear, however, as to whom he has in mind with 
the term “higher persons” — though it seems likely to include scientists and 
philosophers who are especially creative in their work.  The deceptive aspect 
of the poetic impulse applied to life in general by the higher human beings 
to whom Nietzsche’s above exhortations are addressed is thus not used 
primarily as a license to be destructive of society and the world but as the 
power to create ever new worlds.  Nietzsche seems to loosely define a world 
as a collection of objects organized, evaluated, and created according to a 
particular set of standards.  And each of those worlds in its broadest sense is 
a poem.16   
One implication of this view is that adding an ordinary object like a 
new pair of shoes creates a new world.  Though this might initially seem 
counterintuitive, consider the famous scene from the film adaptation of the 
Grapes of Wrath in which a young boy lights up with the joy of a new world 
when he receives a pair of new shoes.  Or take the case of Che Guevara’s 
classic text Guerrilla Warfare.  Guevara mentions shoes no less than twelve 
times in that slim volume, claiming that they are the most important tool in 
the guerilla fighters’ attempt to bring a post-revolutionary world into being.17  
And few things are more poetic than a revolution. 
I will conclude my exploration of these aphorisms by presenting the 
rest of the passage quoted above, the meaning of which seems relatively 
clear: 
 
Whatever has value in our world now does not have value in itself, according to 
its nature — nature is always value-less, but has been given value at some time, 
as a present — and it was we who gave and bestowed it.  Only we have created 
the world that concerns man!  — But precisely this knowledge we lack, and when 
we occasionally catch it for a fleeting moment we forget it again immediately; 
we fail to recognize our best power and underestimate ourselves, the 
contemplatives, just a little.  We are neither as proud nor as happy as we might be.18 
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III. The Gay Science as Poetry 
 
I have already considered two ways in which, according to Nietzsche, The Gay 
Science itself constitutes a type of poetry.  First, from the poetry/prose warfare 
described in aphorism 92, I observed that all prose is merely a kind of 
calcified poetry, constantly fighting its own poetic tendencies.  Thus, The Gay 
Science, just like all prose, can be considered partially de-formed poetry.  
Moreover, The Gay Science would not be Nietzsche’s only prose poem as he 
also composed the epic, ironic prose poem that is Thus Spoke Zarathustra.19 
Second, I noted at the beginning of this essay Nietzsche’s allusion to 
the troubadours’ art of poetry, gai saber, in the subtitle of The Gay Science.  It is 
a widespread tradition for poets in the West to compose a poem entitled “Ars 
Poetica” in which they describe their particular way of writing poetry, which is 
itself in the form of a poem (including those by Archibald MacLeish and 
Timothy Liu).  There are also, incidentally, many other poems that serve the 
same function without the official title, such as Marianne Moore’s “Poetry.”20  
The phrase “Ars Poetica” comes from the Roman poet Horace’s treatise of the 
same name  The contents and styles of these “Ars Poetica” poems vary 
enormously, as one might expect, from one type of poet to another.  
Compare for example these lines from Archibald MacLeish’s contribution: 
 
A poem should be motionless in time 
As the moon climbs.21 
 
to these lines from contemporary American poet Timothy Liu’s effort: 
 
Childhood begins with your first good line —  
a spider waiting for its kill.22 
 
Given the subtitle of the second edition ofThe Gay Science:  with a Prelude in 
Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs, which suggests that the book’s “prose” 
content is surrounded at both ends by a group of individual poems, perhaps 
it would be fruitful to think of The Gay Science as itself an Ars Poetica and 
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therefore as a poem that both enacts and describes the art of poetry as the 
poet understands it.  Moreover, in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche describes 
the troubadours as “magnificent and inventive human beings… to whom 
Europe owes so many things and almost owes itself.” 23  The significance that 
Nietzsche attaches to these knight-poets seems to further support my 
conception of The Gay Science as poetry.  Recall that the title of the book is a 
German translation (Die Fröliche Wissenshaft) of the Latin phrase the 
troubadours used for their art of poetry.  Finally, The Gay Science fits 
Nietzsche’s broad conception of poetry as revealed in the above six 
aphorisms. 
At any rate, these two groups of poems at the beginning and end of 
The Gay Science, particularly in their playful spirit, can be understood as 
forming a poetic boundary which is at the same time a sort of un-bounding 
insofar as it attacks seriousness and serious attempts to contain or achieve 
certainty in knowledge and thereby to contain life itself.  Instead, one is free 
to willfully create knowledge for one’s time in the service of life.   
Consider for example poem 9 from the opening poems, entitled “My 
Roses”: 
 
Yes, joy wants to amuse, 
Every joy wants to amuse. 
Would you like to pick my roses? 
 
You must stoop and stick your noses 
Between thorns and rocky views, 
And not be afraid of bruises. 
 
For my joy — enjoys good teases. 
For my joy — enjoys good ruses. 
Would you like to pick my roses? 24 
 
One would be at a loss here if searching for the kind of clarity and order 
which have long been demanded of philosophical texts by some 
philosophical traditions (sometimes at the cost of the clear thing being 
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pointless, the order stultifying and rigid).  A Western reader encounters the 
phrases “my love is like a rose” and “the soul is a simple substance” with very 
different expectations, allowing possibilities to multiply in the case of the 
former while trying to nail down the timelessly transcendent truth of the 
latter.  Against this bifurcation into serious philosophy and silly poetry, 
Nietzsche offers a prelude and appendix of poems to a philosophical text 
and thereby questions the assumption that poetry and philosophy must be 
interpreted differently. 
In other words, in the face of what Nietzsche might describe as 
“Socratic” attempts to “cage Dionysus,” the “prelude of rhymes” and “appendix 
of songs” can be thought of as rebellious, wicked guards that are always 
flinging open the gates of the cage.  The prelude and appendix are 
nevertheless limits to the “prose” aphoristic center of the text, delimiting 
where the “book” begins and ends.  But since poetry for Nietzsche is self-
mocking, as I have attempted to show in this essay, the prelude and appendix 
also simultaneously un-limit the limits that they embody, loosening and 
unbinding the prose text, which thereby acquires the semblance of poetic 
freedom.  The conventional poetry of the prelude and appendix can be read 
as a reminder to the reader of the light-hearted, subversive, poetic quality of 
the entire text of The Gay Science.  The prelude and appendix of The Gay Science 
are not its only instances of poetic unlimiting limits.  That which the prelude 
and appendix encircle, namely the aphorisms themselves, also resonate with 
poetic unbounding boundaries.  Of particular relevance to this issue is the 
etymology of the word “aphorism.”  The word is derived from the Greek root 
horizein, from which is derived the English word horizon.  As a verb, horizein 
means to bound, to limit, to mark; and in mathematical discourses, a true 
horizon is one in which one’s visibility is unobstructed in all directions, 
resulting in a perfectly circular perspective.  However, the limits enacted by 
even a true horizon are radically perspectival, and with even the slightest 
change of location, the observer finds her/himself no longer bound to those 
limits.  Thus, a horizon should be understood not as an absolute limit but as 
a limit on what can be seen from a given point of view over one period of 
time. 
One could in this light conceive of Nietzsche’s aphorisms as a 
network of these various, circular true horizons, which a reader can overlap 
like seismographic readings to create more complex, subtle, and perhaps 
even accurate “readings” or results.  Furthermore, the true horizon in its 
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circular nature can be articulated theoretically as the result of bending or 
slanting a perfectly straight line.  All but parallel straight lines intersect at 
some point, so even the slightest slant on a line — or a truth — entails 
convergence, intersection, and the likelihood of circularity. As to why 
Nietzsche might have chosen to write this book aphoristically, one likely 
possibility is that most lyric poetry is short, and as a prose poem about 
poetry, it is fitting for The Gay Science to contain a significant number of lyric 
poem-sized sections.  Poetry, as “slanted truths,” as problematic and often 
circular lines of language and thought, can thus be thought of as the “true 
horizon” of language and thought.  As Emily Dickinson reminds us, “Success 
in circuit lies.” 
 
IV. Conclusion:  Slanted Truths 
 
 In light of the above explorations, it seems that the best way of 
characterizing poetry, broadly construed, would be as slanted truths.  
Slanted truths, meaning a plurality of truths attacked and constructed from 
different angles, always from an embedded, embodied perspective and 
always strategically.  Truth slanted — to summarize my above analyses of the 
six aphorisms from The Gay Science — by the tempests of a vision that must 
always be pursued, slanted by the forces of magical incantations, by the 
glancing blows of the perpetual civil war of poetry expressed as prose, 
slanted by the power of creativity.  And especially by the creation of the 
“higher persons” of their ever-evolving cumulative poems, which we call the 
world.  
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3 Plato, Statesman. Philebus. Ion, trans. W. R. M. Lamb (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
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5 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: A Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, trans. Walter 
Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1989), 260. 
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York: Vintage, 1989), 115. 
7 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs, ed. 
Bernard Williams, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage 1974), aphorism 92. 
8 Ibid., emphasis original. 
9 Ibid., emphasis added. 
10 Plato, The Republic of Plato: Second Edition, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic, 1991), Book II: 
369A (p. 45).  
11 The Gay Science, aphorism 299, emphasis added. 
12 Beyond Good and Evil, 24. 
13 Beyond Good and Evil, 42. 
14 The word “delusion” is italicized in Kaufmann’s translation, and the German is italicized 
merely as non-English text.  In Kaufmann’s translation, the word Fortdichter, a Nietzschean 
compound of fort, “continually,” and Dichter “poet,” is omitted entirely; and des Lebens is 
rendered as “this life”; whereas if the present author is correct, a more straightforward 
translation that would also expand the scope of the word “life” would be simply “life.” 
15  Emphasis added.  “Vis creative” means “creative power” (Kaufmann 241n). 
16 The characterization of poetry in this aphorism strongly suggests the original Greek sense of 
poiesis as “making” that is so important to Heidegger in his work on poetry. 
17 See The Grapes of Wrath, DVD, directed by John Ford (Los Angeles, CA: Twentieth Century 
Fox, 1940); and Ernesto “Che” Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, trans. J. P. Morray (New York: 
Barnes and Noble, 2012), 23, 27, 28, 41, 44, 72, 77, 78, 79, 96, 97, 98.     
18 Emphasis original. 
19 The reader is perhaps curious as to why I have chosen The Gay Science as opposed to 
Zarathustra as the exemplar of Nietzsche’s art of poetry, given the fact that the latter is the 
most overtly and conventionally (qua prose poem) poetic of Nietzsche’s texts.  The 
advantage offered by The Gay Science however is a certain meta-analysis of poetry or 
poetics, simultaneous with an enactment of poetry, while Zarathustra, due to its style and 
format, is more purely an enactment of poetry without poetics. 
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22 Timothy Liu, “Ars Poetica,” 1999, 
http://salmagundimagazine.tumblr.com/post/83215274749/ars-poetica-by-timothy-liu. 
23 Beyond Good and Evil, aphorism 260, 201. 
24 The Gay Science, “My Roses,” 45. 
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